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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This report documents the results from an evaluation of the CARE Ill and
ARIES 82 reliability tools for application to advanced fault-tolerant aerospace sys-
tems. The results of this investigation are expected to provide guidance for plan-
ning future reliability modeling research and development.
To determine reliability modeling requirements, the evaluation focuses on the
Charles Stark Draper Laboratories' Advanced Information Processing System
(AIPS) architecture as an example architecture for fault tolerant aerospace sys-
tems. A number of simple reliability problems were formulated and analyzed
using CARE m and ARIES 82. From these test problems and from the reliabil-
ity modeling requirements of AIPS, advantages and limitations were identified for
CARE HI and ARIES 82.
CARE Ill, which was designed primarily for analyzing ultrareliable flight
control systems, was found to have many desirable features. Among these were
the capability of handling large systems, a somewhat flexible fault handling
model, nonconstant failure rates in the fault _ence model, the provision for
near coincident double faults, the computational accuracy required for analyzing
ultrareliable systems, and the user interface, although not fully interactive, which
provides for simple and flexible system definition.
Examination of the reliability modeling requirement for the AIPS architec-
ture, particularlyfor the long missiontimes in space applications,revealedseveral
current limitationsof CARE HI. System scenarioswhich were difficultto model
or could not be modeled with CARE HI were
• Systems with unpuwered spare modules,
• Systems where equipment maintenance must be considered,
• Systems where failure depends on the sequence in which faults oc-
curred, 1 and
• Systems where multiple faults greater than a double near coincident
fault must be considered. 2
XAppmdix B.2 of the CARE rrr Users Guide describes a rnetlx_ to analyze time sequence dependent
faults. "i'nit meth_ essentially esral_ishes Ixxmds for reliability. Under appropriate conditions, usually mh-
$icn times which are shc_ relative to the time Ix.x_veenfa/lures, these bounds should be dose to the actual re-
fiab/I/ty. Far longer rrassion times, such as space al_L/ca_ons , where exhaustion _ ccrnlx_ents and tech-
niques such as function migrauon are factor, it is not dear that the suggested method will be suIfic_endy ac-
o_rate.
Wrhe need to consider near cc/nc_dent faults of crder greater than two arises from configurations such
as the q_intuplex. With short fault recovery intervah and improved ccm[x3nem reliability, mplex ccnfigura-
dm"*.smay meet the needs of future systems and hence the need to analyze higher order, near cc/ncident faults
would not arise. It should be noted, however, that short fault recovery intervals may be difficuh to achieve
lX_ticularly with respect to sc_tware components. It should be further taxed that CARE IIrs inability to han-
dle third order, near cc/ncident faults does not arise because it fails to evaluate the failure probability due to
V
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Also, the computational accuracy of CARE IT[ is limited outside the ultr:LreLiable
re_e.
The ARIES 82 program, whose primary use has been to support university
research and teaching, was found to have a number of desirable features.
Among these were the interactive nature of the program, the ability to handle a
wide range of system scenarios such as systems with and without maintenance
and systems with powered or unpowered spares, the flexibility of user-def'med
state transition matrices, and the computation of performance measures other
than reliability such as a mean time to failure, life cycle measures, and improve-
ment factors. The primary limitations identified for ARIES were
• The use of instantaneous coverage,
• The use of constant transition rates,
• The l_mitations on the size of systems that can be modeled,
• Lack of formal validation,
• Several programming errors, which were apparent from analyzing
sample problems,
• Limited computation accuracy, especially for ultrareliability require-
ments of commercial air transport, and
• ARIES is an unsupported product.
Both CARE HI and ARIES were not suited to dcterm2me the reliability of
complex nodal networks of the type used to interconnect processing sites in the
AIPS architecture. In fact, this particular reliability analysis problem is not
addressed by existing modeling tools and will require the development of new
techniques.
It was concluded that ARIE.S was not suitable for modeling advanced fault
tolerant systems. It was further concluded that, subject to the limitations cited
above, CARE HI is best suited for evaluating the reliability of advanced fault
tolerant systems for air transport.
_dcal triples. The prc6a_lity d _dcal =/pies c_ten are quite small. The li_tadon i,. because CARE III
cannot exclude from the reliability calculation those near coincident do._e faults which wcxdd not lead to
system failure in systems such as the quinru/_ex.
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1.0 Introduction and Scope
Digital flight control systems for spacecraft and aircraft perform life or missions
critical functions. Extremely high reliability requirements must be established and
demonstrated for these systems. To meet the reliability requirements, systems become
large and complex. Size, complexity, and demanding requirements combine to make the
prediction and validation of reliability difficult.
During the system design phase, reliability predictions must be obtained to support
design tradeoffs between potential system architectures. After such a fault tolerant sys-
tem has been built, experimental techniques for establishing reliability, such as life test-
ing and simulation, are often precluded or are of limited value due to high costs. Con-
sequently, sophisticated reliability modeling tools based on analytic models are needed to
predict and validate reliability for both the design and development phases of fault
tolerant systems.
This report details the results of an evaluation of CARE HI and ARIES 82, two
reliability modeling tools for application to fault tolerant system architectures. The
evaluation was performed under NASA Contract NAS1-16489.
CARE HI (Computer Aided Reliability Estimation) is the latest in a series of relia-
bility assessment tools co-developed by NASA-LaRC and Raytheon. It was primarily
designed for analyzing ultrareliable flight control systems. ARIES 82 (Automated Relia-
bility Interactive Estimation System) is based on a unified model for reliability estima-
tion developed by Ng and Avizienis at the University of California, Los Angeles. Its
primary use has been to support university research and teaching.
The objective of this evaluation was to perform a comparative analysis and assess-
ment of CARE HI and ARIES 82 for application to advanced fault tolerant flight control
systems such as the Advanced Information Processing System (AIPS) being developed by
Charles Stark Draper Laboratories. Specifically, the following tasks were performed:
1. The AIPS architecture information was obtained and reviewed. The
suitability of CARE HI and ARIES 82 for AIPS analysis was deter-
mined.
2. A comparative analysis of CARE HI and ARIES 82 was carried
out.
3. CARE HI and ARIES 82 were applied to problems of varying com-
plexity.
4. The limitations of CARE 131 and ARIES 82, with respect to applica-
tion to advanced fault tolerant architectures, were determined.
The fault tolerant features of the AIPS architecture are reviewed in Section 2.0 of
this report. Section 3.0 provides an overview of the CARE Ill and ARIES 82 fault
models. In Section 4.0, test cases that were analyzed using CARE HI and ARIF_ 82 are
described and the results are given. In Section 5.0, CARE HI and ARIES 82 are com-
pared and the limitations of each are identified.
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2.0 Advanced Information Processing System (AII_)
2.10b|ect/ves and Requirements [I]
The Advanced Information Processing System (AIPS) is a fault and damage tolerant
system architecture which satisfies real-time data processing requirements for aeroslmce
applications. The specific requirements for seven aerospace applications were esta-
blished by Draper Laboratories and are given in Figure 2.1. As can be seen, a wide
range in each resource requirement or performance parameter is covered by these appli-
cations.
Attributes of the AIPS architecture are
• Growth and Change Tolerance,
• Accepts Technology Upgrades,
* Graceful Degradation,
• System Complexity is Transparent to the User,
• Graded Redundancy, and
• Damage Tolerance.
2.2 AIPS Architectural Features and Betiding Blocks [1]
The elements for the AIPS architecture are the Fault Tolerant Multiprocessor
(FTMP), the Fault Tolerant Processor (FUP), a fault and damage tolerant Intercomputer
Network (IC), a fault and damage tolerant Input/Output Network (I/O), a faul*, tolerant
mass memory, a fault tolerant power distribution system, and a network operzting gys-
tern which allows the elements to operate together.
Figure 2.2 shows the proof-of-cencept model of the AIPS architecture. AIPS con-
sists of processing sites, either FTMP or FTP, which arc. distributed as necessary
3
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Figure 2.1. AIPS Application Requirements
throughout the vehicle. They are linked by a layered damageand fault tolerant IC net-
work. Input/Output buses provide aocessto Input/Output devices. Processing sites and
I/O buses may have a global, regional, or local extent. For example, most or all pro-
cessing sites would have access to I/O devices that are connected via a global I/O bus,
e.g., an I/O bus that is connected to each processing site. A local I/O bus could connect
I/O devices to one processing site. Similarly, software operating systems for AIPS can
have global, regional, or local control. Access to a fault tolerant mass memory is pro-
vided via a dedicated mass memory bus.
Resources within the distributed system are usually assigned to a fixed set of func-
tions. Under certain conditions, such as a change in mission phase or a hardware
failure, the computing resources can be reassigned to other functions. This capability
allows for limited distributed processing and is called semi-dynamic function migration.
Function migration is expected to be used to reconfigure system resources in order to
achieve higher reliability for critical functions or to meet the resource or power require-
ment due to changes in a mission phase.
Hardware redundancy is implemented at the processor, memory, and bus level.
Redundancy provides for fault detection and for continued operation of the system fol-
lowing a component failure. Redundant elements are operated in tight synchronism
resulting in improved fault coverage and latency. Fault detection and masking functions
are implemented in hardware. Tight synchronism requires that these functions be
invoked frequently. By implementing these functions directly in hardware, the need for
additional computational resources required by a software implementation is avoided.
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The less frequently invoked fault isolation and reconfiguration functions are imple-
mented in software.
The successful distribution of data from a simplex source to redundant processors is
necessary to avoid single point failures. The processors must exchange their copies of
the simplex data to assure that the same data values are being used by each processor.
The process of establishing source congruency is supported and made efficient in the
AIPS architecture by use of software and special hardware features.
A triplex FTP architecture is shown in Figure 2.3. The FTP can be configured in
simplex, duplex, or triplex processor form. Each FTP channel has an Input/Output pro-
cessor (IOP) and a computational processor (CP). These processors have separate
memories, docks, and timers. The IOP has interfaces to the I/O and IC buses. The
processors have access to a shared memory, interfaces to the mass memory, and to data
exchange hardware. The data exchange hardware is used to exchange data between
redundant channels, to detect faults, and to mask faults. Redundant channels are
tightly synchronized using a fault tolerant dock.
The IOP interfaces to a redundant IC network. It receives from each layer of the
IC network and detects and masks faults. However, it can only transmit on one layer of
the network. The other layers in the network are reserved for the remaining redundant
channels in the FTP. With respect to a single channel, the receive interface is cross-
strapped and the transmit interface is not.
The FTMP shown in Figure 2.4 is composed of a number of computational proces-
s_ (processors with local memory) all interconnected via a redundant, fully cross-
LU
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strapped multiprocessor bus. A shared memory can be accessed via the multiprocessor
bus. _ configurations could consist of triads of CP's interfaced to the I/0 bus, to
the IC network, or the mass memory bus. Some triads could be connected on/y via the
multiprocessor bus.
The _ fault tolerance features such as synchronism, docking, and redundancy
are simi/ar to those of FrP.
The intercomputer network (IC) mists of three identical, independent layers.
Each layer consists of a number of multiported, circuit switched nodes interconnected by
communication rinks. Nodes are generally associated with specific processing sites.
Communication between any two processing sites can be established by selecting a suit-
able combination of nodes and links. If a link fails, communications between two sites
can be reestablished by using another combination of nodes and links.
The I/O network is similar to the IC network except that only one layer is imple-
mented.
In summary, some of the key fault tolerant features are
• FTMP and FTP Concepts,
• Hardware Redundancy,
• Redundant Elements in Tight Synchronism,
• Fault detection and masking implemented in hardware,
e Fault isolation and reconfiguration implemented in software,
• A layered nodal intercomlmter communications network with recon-
figuration features,
• A nodal I/O communications network with reconfiguration features,
• Features to support and efficiently implement the process to estab-
fish source congruency, and
9
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• Function Migration.
2.3 AIPS Requirements and Futures Impacting Reliability Assessment [2]
A number of AIPS requirements and architectural features impact reliability assess-
ment. Among those the following are of particular significance for the purpose of this
report.
1. Resource requirements are, for some applications, large and hence
the number of high level components (processors, memories, etc.)
can become large.
2. A high degree of fault tolerance is required resulting in the need to
account for failure of fault handling as well as the exhaustion of
components.
3. Applications require both short and very long mission times.
4. For some applications, the architecture results in large nodal net-
works.
5. The Intercomputer Network is partiaUy cross-strapped.
6. The function migration feature required for some applications can
complicate reliability analysis.
Some applications for Ali'S will permit system maintenance and repair (open sys-
tem), others will not (dosed system). Certain space missions will require the use of
unpowered spare system modules, and hence the capability to model different failure
rates for powered and unpowered components will be needed.
The use of function migration will impact reliability analysis in a number of ways.
For example, loss of the system function will depend on whether function migration can
11
be completed. This could depend upon whether a particular fault occurs before or after
the need for function migration. Consequently, loss of system function will depend on
the order or sequence of fault occurrence.
The long mission t_,.,nes could impact the accuracy of reliability estimates made using
numerical approximations.
Partial cross-strapping of the IC networks dictates that processing sites and the IC
network cannot be analyzed independently (structurally decomposed).
The large nodal communication networks required impact the reliability analyses.
Figure 2.5 shows a simple nodal communications network between a triple redundant set
of sensors, processors, and actuators. This network is connected in a planar topology.
It can be determined by observation that the loss of two links can isolate a node and that
the loss _f three _ will lead to system failure. Determining the number of failure
combinations that lead to loss of system is slightly more difficult but is not too demand-
ing. However, the more complex network given in H_u'e 2.6 is much more difficult to
analyze. In applications using the AIrS architecture, network failures can be a major
factor determining system unreliability. Consequently, the capability to analyze complex
nodal networks will be necessary for some AIPS applications. Further, this capability
could be used to develop better networ_ topologie3 such as the nlternate network shown
in Figure 2.5. With this alternate non-planar topology, three failures are required to
isolate a node and six failures are required for loss of system. In such a case, network
reliability would be sufficiently high on short missions that system reliability Would not
be affected.
I2
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Figure 2.5. Simple Network Topologies
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3.0 OVERVIEW OF ARIES AND CARE HI
s.l [3]
Because of the ultrareliability requirements of the AIPS architecture, an analytic
method of assessing reliability is required. This method must be sufficiently general to
cover the wide range of systems that can be developed with AIPS. It must also be com-
putationally feasible. One widely used method is to model the system as a finite-state,
continuous-parameter Markov process X(t), t_eO. In this model, the state probabilities
are deemed as pj(t) = P[X(t)=j'], the probability that the system is in state j at time t;
tim transition probabilities as I_gt,t+h) = P[X(t+h)=j [ X(t)=i], the probability that
the system is in state j at time t+ h given that it was in state i at time t; and the transi-
tion rates qj(t) and qij(t) as
and
d t%(t) = _'Pij(), i * j
d
qj(t) = -d-_-pjj(t)
- d-_-[1- _' Pij(t)]
i_j
= --_qij(O •
i_tj
The system's state probabilities can then be found by solving the matrix equation
P'(t)=Q(t)P(t),
where P(t)= (pl(t),p2(t),...,Pn(t)) is the state probability vector for the system's n opera-
tional states and
I$
[I,qj(O, i --
is the transition rate matrix. The rc_ability of the system at time t is then given by
n
R(t) = _pi(t) •
i-1
Both ARIES and CARE HI use this Markovian model; however, they differ in their
definition of states and transition probabilities. In ARIES, the Markov process is
assumed to be time-homogeneous; i.e., the transition probabilities Plj(t,t+h) depend not
on the initial time t but on the elapsed time h. As a result of this assumption, the states
of the model must have ex[xmential!y distributed holding times. Fault-occurrence states
are differentiated according to configuration so that a state reconfigured with spares is
different from a state with the same number of active modules but in which an
uncovered spare failure has occurred. This distinction is made because the system can
degrade from the former but not from the latter state. There are no fault-handling
states: coverage is assumed to be instantaneous and is incorporated into the transition
rates as a constant probability.
In CARE 111, time-homogeneity is not required and non-exponentially distributed
holding times are allowed. The fault-occurrence states are defined only by the number
of operational active and spare modules: no distinction is made as in ARIES between
degradable and nondegradable configurations. However, the transition rates are formu-
lated so that the state probabilities are the same as they are in ARIES. [4] Coverage is
modeled in CARE In by fault-handling states, which represent the detection, isolation,
and recovery from errors, and failure states, which are entered because of coverage
16
failure. Both of these reliability tools are dL_sed in the following s_om.
3.2 Am [S] [6] F]
3.2.1 G_eral Description
ARIES is an interactive, unin_ reliability modeling tool developed by Ng and
Avizienis at UCLA. The current version, ARIES 82, is writ_n in C for use on UNIX
systems and is intended primarily as a teaching aid in the evaluation-based design of Fr
In ARIES, a system is defined to be a series configuration of homogeneous subsys-
tems, each of which can be modeled as a finite-state, continuous-parameter, tim:-
homogeneous Markov process. State aggregation is achieved through this structural
decomposition since, rather than considering the system as a whole, each subsystem is
analyzed separately and the results combined to give system reliability. State reduction
is also achieved by approximating fault-handling states through instantaneous coverage.
In ARIES there are six basic models defining dosed, repairable, and renewable sys-
terns as follows:
Type1
Type2
Type3
Type4
Type5
Type6
Closed FT System with Permanent Faults,
Closed FF System with Transient Fault Recovery,
Missi0n-Oriented Repairable System,
Repairable System with Transient Fault Recovery,
Repairable System with Restart, and
PeriodicaUy Renewed Closed FT System.
The Type 1 system is a closed fault tolerant system. It does not undergo any exter-
hal repair or renewal and all faults that occur are assumed to be permanent faults. The
system can have powered or unpowered spares and can degrade after the swtres are
17
exhausted. However, the system's ability to degrade can be blocked by unrecoverable
spare failures, since it is assumed that if an undetected and unrecoverable failure exists
in a spare, the system cannot activate succeeding spares and will fail when that spare is
switched in. It is also assmned that spares are periodically tested, that spare selection is
predetermined, and that a failed module is removed from the system.
The model for the dosed FT system (Type 1) is shown in Figure 3.1. The states in
this model correspond to triples of the form (y,s,d), where
y = the number of fault-free active units,
s = the number of available spares,and
d = the number of degradations allowed
and (y,-'_,d), where
y = the beginning number of active units,
s = the number of accessible spares,and
d=0.
The (y,s,d) states represent reconfigurations of the system as active modules fail and are
replaced by spares until all spares are exhausted and the system degrades, terminating in
one of two final states (safe shutdown or system failure). The (y,--'_,d) states represent
reconfigurations of the subsystem that cannot be degraded becau_ an undetected and
unrecoverable error exists in a spare and will cause system failure when that spare is
switched in. There are no states to represent fault handling: these states are approxi-
mated by coverage probabilities associated with the transitions between the fault
occurrence states.
18
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This model is instantiated by assigning values for the parameters D, S, CS,
k, I_, Y, andCY. The parameter D is the number of degradatiom the system can sus-
tain, i.e, the number of active units that can be lost without replacement; S, the number
of spares. CS is the coverage associated with each spare; if CS < 1, then the blocked
spare states, (y,s,d), of the model can be entered, k and _ are the failure rates for the
active and spare units, respectively, and are assumed to be constant. If p, = X, the
spares arc assumed to be powered; if f_ <: X, they arc assumed to be unpowcrcd.
Although unpowercd spares arc aXlowed, I_ must be greater than zero and k__ must be
no greater than 10 _. The number of active modules in cach degraded configuration is
entered as a vector Y--(A, A-I, ..., A-D, A-(D+ 1)), where Y[0] is the initial
number of active units, Y[i] is the number after the i-th degradation, and Y[D+ I] is the
number in the safe shutdown state. The coverage probabilities associated with the tran-
sitions between configurations is entered as a vector
CY = (CA, CA-l, ..., CA-D, CA-(D+I)), where CY[O] is the coverage probabi!ity used
for all transitions while any spares remain and CY[i] is that used for the transition to the
i.th degradation. If there are no spares in the system, CY[0] is never used.
Each of the six models has an identifying set of parameters. These parameters
specify configuration, failure modes, and coverage mechanisms for each system type.
For a complete list of the ARIES parameters, _ee Figure 3.2.
Systems that do not conform to the assumptions for Types 1 - 6 or cannot be
decomposed into subsystems of these types cannot be accurately described by those
models. However, any system that can be represented by a single state transition-rate
20
Yl01=
S--
D--
Y=
Z=
it --
//---
7--
D--
CS --
CY[i] =
NP --
CR =
X--
TIi]=
Z
CE[i] ---
CE --
Initial number of active modules
Initial nomber of spare modules
Number of degradations allowed in the active set
Active resource vector (Y[0],...,Y[D],Y[D+I])
Computing capacity vector (Z[0],...,Z[D],0)
Failure rate of one active module
Failure rate of one spare module
Failure rate of one good module in safe shutdown condition
Transient fault arrival rate of one active module
Mean duration of a transient fault
Coverage for recovery from spare failures
Coverage associated with the transition to
the degraded configuration specified by Y[i]
Coverage vector for active failures
CY[0I,...CY[DI,CY[D+I],
Number of recovery phases for transient faults
Recoverability from transient faults
Interference rate for transient faults
The failure rate of all hardware involved
in executing the transient recovery processes
The duration of the ith recovery phase
for transient faults
Recovery duration vector for transient faults
T[il,...,T[NP]
Tile effectiveness of the ith recovery phase
for transient faults
Recovery effectiveness vector for transient faults
C.1.,[1I,...,CI_,[NP]
Figure 3.2. ARIES Parameters
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matrix can be solved by ARIES. For these Type 7 systems, the user enters the complete
system transition-rate matrix rather than specifying values for model parameters. This
user-specified matrix is then incorporated into the solution of the system in the same
manner as the matrix that is generated from the fixed ARIES models.
3.2.2 Solution Method
As a result of the time-homogeneous restriction in ARIES, the transition-rate
matrix Q(t) simplifies to
O(t) = qj, i=
and the matrix equation simplifies to
Thus,
P'(t) = QP(t).
1,(t)=
This system is solvedin ARIES as
where cq is an eigenvalue of Q.[3] The solution's use of Sylvester's theorem to evaluate
e _ requires that the transition-rate matrix have distinct eigenvalues. This requirement
restricts the ratio of the active unit failure rate (k) to the _pare unit failure rate (p,) in a
system with unpowered spares to k__ < i0_, O<g<k.
p.
To implement the solution, the transition-rate matrix, Q, is determined from either
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eigenvalues of Q are computed from the model parameters; otherwise, they are com-
puted by reducing Q to upper Hessenberg form and applying the QR algorithm. If non-
distinct eigenvalues occur, the duplicates are dropped from the computation.
Next, the probability polynomial coefficient matrix, B, is constructed f_om Q; the
d/.v_,wt eigenvalues, or, of Q; and the initial state probability distribution, P(0). The ini-
tial probability distribution I_0) for dosed and repairable systems and close.xi phases of a
PRC system is
P(O) = 0,0,...,0) ;
for the renewal phase of a FRC system,
P(O)= O,o,...,o)e
where Q1 is the transition rate matrix for the closed operation phase.
After B is constructed, P(t) is computed for each state k, from B and or, as
ek(t) = _".bjke -o't.
J
Once the state probabilities are solved, the reliability of the subsystem is compu_i as
R(t) = X Pk(t);
k
i.c., as the sum of the state probabilities of the constitucnt states.
With the reliability Ra(t ) of each of the n subsystems comprising the system thus
computed and with the assumption of serial configuration of subsystems, the system reli-
ability R(t) is computed as
R(t) = IIRi(t).
i=l
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3.2.3 Output !
System reliability is reported for user-specified time intervals. For each time inter-
val, the reliability of the complete system and the reliability of each component subsys-
tem is reported. The report is displayed on the terminal screen but can also be written
to a log file, plotted on a SOLTEC281 plotter, or filtered to a UNIX plotting tool.
In addition to system reliability, _ can compute and display the mean time to
first system failure, the normalized percentage of failure of each component subsystem,
the reliability improvement factor and the mission time improvement factor of one sys-
tem over other systems, the system failure rate, and, for renewable systems, life-cycle
measure8.
3.3 CARE Ell
3.3.1 General Description[S] [9] [10]
In CARE III, a system is defined to be a configuration of stages, where each stage
is a group of identical modules. Stage failures are independent. Stages within a system
may be dependently coupled as described by a fault tree. A module occupies a distinct
state for each combination of its fault status (whether a fault has occurred or not), fault
category (mode of failure and associated occurrence .... /, and coverage state (detection
and handling of the fault). Denoting module a in stage x by (x,a), the states occupied
by a are defined by the vector (d(x,a),i(x,a),c(x,a)), where
if (x,a) is operational]d(x,a) = if (x,a) is faulty J,
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i(x,a) = fault category, and
c(x,a) = coveragestate.
The states of the system arc then defined by the M-dimensional vector (d,L_, where
d- (d(1,1),...,d(x,n(x)),...,d(N,n(N))),
i ffi (i(1,1),...,i(x,n(x)),...,i(N,n(N))),
c = (c(1,1),...,c(x,n(x)),...,c(N,n(N))),
n(x) = number of modules in xth stage,
N = number of stages in system, and
N
M= _P.n(x).
To reduce the number
ing states according to the
x-1
of system states, aggregate states are constructed by group-
number of faulty modules in a stage, the system fault tree,
the coverage structure (i.e., fault-handling states), and the critical pairs fault trees. Thir,
reduced system is only semi-Markov; but, assmning a large difference between the rates
for the coverage states and those for the fault-occttrrcnce states, it can be decomposed
into a semi-Markov coverage model and a non-homogeneous Markov reliability model.
3.3.1.1 Coverage Model
Three types of faults are represented in CARE HI: permanent, intermittent, and
transient. A permanent fault is any fault that persists until the device is repaired; an
intermittent fault, any fault that persists only part of the time due, for example, to a
loose connection, a poor bond, etc; and a transient fault, any fault which is not caused
by a permanent defect, but nevertheless manifests a faulty behavior for some finite time
and then disa_.[11] The User's Guide defines error as any condition in which a
module is incorrectly performing its function. Although the User's Guideis not explicit
7£
about the endurance of an error,the CARE UI faultm_dels implicitlyassume that an
error, once produce_, cannot disappear.
The CARE m coverage model consistsof two models and accommodates two types
of coverage failures:singlefaultand double fault.Beth of these models arc discussed
in the followingsections.
3.3.1.1.1The Single-FaultModel
A singlefaultcoverage failureoccurs when a faultin a module causes an errorbefore
the faultisdetectedand the module isolated.The single-faultmodel isshown in F/gurc
3.3.
E
m m
F,E
Let F
The states are
m
A= FE:
B= FE:
AB= FE:
1_= FE:
A_
= event of a fault at time t
(any of the 3 fault types),
= event of an error at time t, and
= complement of F, E.
the fault persists but has not produced an en'or,
an intermittent or transient fault has healed without producing an error,
the faultpersistsand has produced an error,
the intermittentfaulthas healed but the errorpersists,
the fault was detecte_l in the active state,
the fault was detected in the benign state,
the fault was detected as permanent from AD, and
the fault was detected as permanent from B_.
In CARE fits terminologystatesFl_ (A) and FE (A_ are act_e Latentstates;
(BE) is a benign latent state; FE (B) is the benign state. This distinction is im_Ixn'tant since
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CARE In assumes that co-existing latent faults in two distinct modules either within a
stage or between stages (as spedfied by the user) constitutes loss of system. 1"best pairs
are referred to as critical pairs.
Within the single fault model, the possible transitions and the corresponding transi-
tion rates are
A to B alpha,
A to AD 8(0,
A to A E 0(t),
Av to BE alpha,
A E to A D ce('r),
A E to Failure (t-c)_('r),
B to A beta,
 toAE beta,
BE to 13D C_(_),
BE to FAILURE (1-c)_(T),
A D to A instantaneous,
A D to I_^ instantaneous,
BD to B instantaneous,and
I_ to I_B instantaneous.
xac Lraasmoa rates a aria ¢ are constant rates; the functions 8(t), 0(t), and _(t) are
restricted to either exponential or uniform densities of the form
Oexp(-0t), t > 0
or
1
0, 0<t<
Assuming that t and ,, °,-,, ,,,,,.,_ .... a r....- +t._ ,..+ enh-y :..... " (A BE)
................ •.. _.._. A,aaL tutv A ut r-+ E or , r_pg¢-
28
tively, then the single fault coverage model is a semi-Markov _.
The transition parmneters a and [3 define the three fault types as follows:
Permanent Fault when
Intermittent Fault when
Transient Fault when
a=_=O,
a _ O, 13_ O, and
a*O,_=O.
When a Transient Fault reaches the B state, CARE HI reconfigures the system to its
status prior to the occurrence of the fault (i.e., it treats the system as if the fault had
never ¢x_trred).
In setting up the system model, the user has the option of defining five different
single-fault models (i.e. the user may select five different sets of model parameters a, fl,
8, p, PA, PI0- In addition, the user may select a rate of entry (each with a Weibutl dis-
tribution) for each of the five single-fault models. Let Xj denote the _.h single fault model
for stage x. Then the rate of entry into the single fault coverage model is given by
k(t[xj) = k(xj)_(xj)t _'(xj)-l.
These rates of entry may be different for each of the 70 possible stages accommodated
bycAm m.
CARE HI then aggregates the sin#e-fault models associated with each stage into
one singie-fault model by OR-ing the A States, the B States, etc. of Figure 3.3. The
resultant aggregate model is non-homogeneous. The aggregation is illustrated in Figure
3.4. CARE ITI provides the additional option of allowing the user to select non-constant
transition rates for 8, p and ,E, corresponding to uniformly distributed sojourn functions.
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In order to illustrate CARE m's technique for defining single-fault models, con-
sider a sin_e-stage system that m_,y experience tWO tyl_s of faults: permanent and inter-
mJttent. The corresponding fault-modeh are shown in Figure 3.5. For each fault type,
the user must define the parameters or, [3, c, E, p, PA, PB- For the permanent fault,
ct = 13 = 0. For the intermittent fault, a _ 0, [3 _ 0. The user must also define the
r_te of occurrence associated with each fault type. This is done by selecting a pair of
Wcibull parameters for each fault type. Figure 3.5 also illustrates the aggregation of the
two models into one single-fault model. For example, the ag_egatcd transitions a(t),
p(t) arc derived from the two models as
--
3.3.1.1.2 The Double-Fault Model
÷ P l'J
P^,Itj , P^,ltJ
A potential cause of loss of control is the, occurrence of a fault in one component of a
redundant set in close t_-_e proximity with a previous, but independent, fault in a dif-
ferent component. These combination_ are near-coincident f_ults and are only con-
sidered potentially catastrophic if both faults are simultaneo,_ly either active or produc-
ino_ an error. CARE HI cccommodatcs ncar-coinddcnt double-faults by allowing the user
to designate w_ch modules are vulneral_le to doublc-fault_ ("critica_ pairs" in CARE
HI's terminology). The modules may be paired within a stage or a:oss two stages.
CARE IU, however, does not handle ncar-coinddcnt trifle , quadruple, etc. fault combi-
nations. The double-fault modcl is _hown in Hguze 3.6.
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The fault-handling procedure is as follows:
I. A single fault occurs. If a second fault occurs while the fh-st
fault is in one of the states A, A E or BE, then CARE HI
assumes that this constitutes a system failure.
2. If, however, the first fault is in the B state upon the occurrence
of the second fault, then state ,A2BI of the double-fault model
will be entered (,_ as the union of states A, A E, BE of the
single-fault model). If the detected state is entered, CARE HI
will configure out the faulty module.
It is important to note that the transitions of the double-fault model are completely
determined by those of the single-fault model. Effectively, CARE HI assumes that the
processes which cause the transitions of the single-fault model are independent across
modules. The single and double-fault models are incorporated in combination in the
CARE HI stage representation as shown in Figure 3.7. It is assumed that near-
coincident, double, critical faults always result in loss of system, and no accommodation
i
is made for near-coincident triple or larger combinations of critical_ fauAtso
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3.3.1.2 Reliability Model
In the reliabilitymodel, the aggregatestatesare indexed by a setL of faultvectors
1, where
I = (I(1),I(2),...,I(N)),
l(x) = number of failed modules in xth stage, and
0<l(x)<n(x) and l_x<N.
The set L can be decomposed into two sets L and L such that the sys:em is opcrational
for 1 _ L and failed for 1 E L, and L = L U L. The aggregate states can then be grouped
into the sets H(I), C_, and F(,D as follows:
forl_ L:
H(I) = {(d,i,f_:_d(x,a) = l(x),l<x'_N}
forlc L:
[(d_R): _d(x,a)=l(x), l<x_N and
G0_ = Ic does not spccify any coverage failure
[(d,i,f,): _ d(x,a)= l(x), I_x<N and
F(D [c specifies at least one coverage failure •
H(J_ is the set of states in which the system has failed due to s )arcs exhaustion;
G(_l),the statesin which the system isoperational;and F{_),the statesinwhich the sys-
tem has faileddue to coverage failure.Given thatthe reliabilityof the system at time t
is
R(t) = P(system is in state GO) at time t, J_L)
= v(x(t)=c,0))
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and letting P(tD denote P(X(t)=G_), Q(t D denote P(X(t)-F(I)), trod S(t_) denote
pCK(t)= H(l)), the reliability of the system is
3.3.2 Solution Method
R(t) = EP(t_
.kL
kL _L
Given that for a fault vector 1,1+1(y) is I with one more fault in stage y, the possi-
ble transitions between the aggregate states are
(a) I L: G(l) toF(D,
(b) _L and 1+ l(y)cL: G(.I) to GO.+ l(y)),
(c) _L and 1+ I(y)EL: GO) to F0.+ l(y)),
(d) _L and 1+ I(y)_E: G(1) to H_+l(y)),and
(e) LEL and I+I(y)EL: H(I) to H(l.+l(y)).
Note that there are no transitions from F(I) states since these states are absorbing.
Denoting these rates as tt(t_ for (a); k0)(t_ 1+1(Y)) for (b); g(2)(t[L l+l(y)) for
(c); and k'(t_, l+ 1(3')) for (d) and (e), the forward differential eqtmtions for the system
are
dp(tLO = -P(tLl)kCt_) + EP(tLL-1Cx))kO)CtLL-l(x)_,
X
d_t O(tLO = P(tLl)tt(tLl ) + _P(tL].-l(x))k(2)(t_-l(x),l),and
d'_'S(t_ - -s(tLOk'(t_ + E[P(tLL-I(x)) + S(t[l.-l(x))]k'(t[J.-l(x),l)],
(1)
x(t_ = _(t_ + y.x'(t_, l+z(x))
X
and
x'(tLI)= x(t_) - _(tLD.
Comidcring the con_tions govcming transi_ons b end c,
x(1)(t_,i+l(y))+ ,x(2)(t_,i+l(y))= ,anOX'(t_i+l(y)).
Furthcrmorc, duc to the high reliabilityof the systcms modeled by CARE HI,
X(1)(t_,J.+l(y)) and k(t_) must gcneraJ]y be much laxgcr than X(2)(t_,L+l(y)) and
p.(t_, respectively. Tbcrcforc,
k'(tLD= k(t[D - tt(t_
= x(t_
and
k'(t_1+1(y)) k0)(t_l+Z(y)) + ),(2)(t_!+Z(y))
= k0)(t_ l+Z(y)).
For computation of system unre_bility, it is necessary to compute the Q(t_) occu-
parley probabiliti=. If the tralasitiol_ tt(tL]_, K(1)(t_ l+J_jr)) , and k(2)(tL_ J.+Jf_y)) were
known, then the P(t_)'$ and, hence, Q(t_)'s could be solved for by simple quadratures.
Schematically, the aggregated states of the stage model are shown in Figure 3.8. Let
sl, s2, ..., s_ = states of the l-th operational model,
l_, I}2, ..., Pn = corresponding occupancy probabilities,and
Bt, _2, -.-, 8n = oorresponding exit transitions
It can be shown that
+ _2+ "'" + _=: -_a_ + c_,(t),
i-!
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PI states' PI+I states
P'1+1,1+1 = ;ZSin+X.u+ 1
Q1 states QI+I states
Figure 3.8. $chemat/c of Aggregated States of Stage Model
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where G(t) is a linear combination of the occupancyprobabilities of the previous (i.e, 1-
1) operational model. It is important to note that G is independent of the occupancy
probabilities of the I+ 1 operational model.
Accordingly, the aggregated occupancy probability Pl is
and
_(t_)--- 1_-i- p2-1- ... +_
where
_tll) = -P(tll)k(tLl) + G , (4)
m
x(,l_ = i-x . (5)
i-I
The required transition probabilities are
ill !
(6)
+'-" ,
i-1
(7)
and
It(t_- k(t_- X.(1)(t_ l+J_))- k(2)(t_, I+J_Y)) • (8)
Siam the computation of lh(t), p2(t), ..., pa(t) would require the solution of the entire
model, alternate expressions for the oc_pancy, probabilities are obtained by. _cdving the.
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model in L_o_flon from the rest of the system.
Ass_ that the l-th opc_fion_ model was entered at time T, then, if the ini_
•conditiom are known, the occupancy probabil/ties of the internal states sl, s2, ..., Sm can
be found. Let these probabilities be denoted by
..., 3
Then
pi(t) = flbi(t-:)Prob[operational model was entered in (:,:+d'r)] . (9)
Although the Prob[operational model was entered in (T,T+dT)] is not known, an approx-
imate value can be found by assuming that coverage is perfect; i.e, that system failure is
due entirely to exhaustion of components. Let PI"-1(t) be the probability that the system
is operational after I-I faults; then P]'_1(t) can be obtained by combinatorial methods; i.e,
.I:(+)[ I[ 1P (t_ = (x) 1- r(tlx)I(,) r(tlx) +(')-]('),
1" Iwhere r(tlx) - exp - 0f_iX(ulxOdu denotes the reliability of a module in stage x. Let
_I be the rate of the next fault. In general, _I will be a function of the fault rate 4, X, of
each module and l; e.g., in a triplex voting system with spares, _I = 3). where ). = the
failure rate of a single module. Then,
Prob[l-th model was entered in (_',T+d_')] _ Pl'_1(_r)lql(_-)dr
3 t represe_, ilobel time; t - _r,local time
' this ratecould be Weibulldistributed,in whichcaselql is alsoa functiono/t
(10)
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(_h is a function of T for a Weibull distribution).
Note that PI'-I(T) is the probability that the system has exit. rienced exactly 1-1 faults at
time T and has survived to time _-.
t
pift) _ f Oi(t--T)Pl'-l(x)qldx (11)
v_O
Accordingly, from (9),
ESi(t) f _)i(t-T)P;-l(_')_l ch"
and,from(7),
k(2)(tLL I+_3r) ) = hB ,=0 (12)t )
/ l_i(t -')PI'- l(')_ld"
ani
and similarly for k(1)(t[L l+J_y)).
Thus, to obtain the desired transitions,
T-O
(1) For each 1, compute Ol(t-¢), _(t-_'),
(2) ComputeP;__(¢)_(¢).
(3) Evaluate the integrals (11).
(4) Compute the transitions aco3rding to (12).
In actual practice, CARE HI makes another ap_tion in the computation of
x(2)(tLL l+lfy)): since (11) can be rewritten as
pi(t)= f _(x)Pl"_l(t-x)_(t-x)dx
x-O
and, in practice, Pl'_l(t) is a much more slowly varying function than l_i(x), P1-1
approximated by
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P_'__(t-x)= a(t) + xb(O+ x_t) (13)
over the range of • in which Ot(x) is significantly different _mn zero.
Substituting these transition rates, which are perfect coverage rates, in the equation
for l_t _, yie.ldmthe ¢,q_mtion
dp'(t_-- -P'(t_k'(tL1) + _'.P'(tLl.-l(x))k'(t_l.-l(x),.l)
for the probability of I faults at time t, given perfect coverage.
RcptacinsP'(t_)forP(t_ in theequatiomforC_t_ and S(t_ _ulm in
and
s(tLO= P'(tLO.
Thus, CARE HI can solve for the Q(t_'s without first solving for the P(t_'s and the.
reliability of the system can be computed as
_t)- 1- Xa(tLO- XI"(tLO.
_L kL
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4.0 'TEST CASES
4.1 Introduction
In order to evaluate how well CARE m and ARIES can be used to assess the mlln-
bi]ity of AIPS ax__zcs, it was necessary to determine how useful and applicable
these tools are. Also, since each tool has inherent limitations, it was necessary to deter-
mine how flexible each tool is with respect to accommodating systems that stress those
limitations. Thus, several sample systems were selected to demonstrate the use of,
applicability, limitations, and relative accuracy of CARE TIT and ARIES. These test
cases do not test all of the features of each tool, nor do they attempt to verify the tools.
In particular, they do not test all of the _ system types nor all of the performan_
measures that it computes. For CARE m, the impact of state aggregation in assessing
very large sDtems, the fun use of the fault handling model, and non-constant failure
rates were not tested. These test case results coupled with the AiPS requirements serve
as a basis for a relative assessmcat of the two reliability modeling tools.
The test cases range in complexity from a single processor architecture to a system
suitable for flight control applications. Cases were selected to demonstrate relative
strengths and weaknesses of the two modeling tools. Also, it was absolutely essential
that accurate solutions could be obtained for the test cases. For each case a solution was
obtained based on standard analysis techniques and subject to assumptions appropriate
for the particular _o and parameters. The solutions were calculated using simple
uJmputcr programs. Other than the use of double precision variables, no speci_
44
numerical techniques were employed to ensure the accuracy of the calculations. Conse-
queerly, the accuracy is limited to that inherent in double precision floating point arith-
merle (64 bits) and in the numerical techniques used to compute the exponential fun¢.
tion. Under these conditions it was determined that computation of e -x for _,<10 -is
was subject to error. Since the probability of system failure on the order of 10-1° was of
interest, the ao_u'acy under these limitations was judged to be adequate. The test cases
were then solved using CARE m and _ and the three results compared. Due to
limitations in either CARE m or ARIES, results from only one of these models could be
obtained for some cases. In addition, wherever feasible, the test cases were described as
both Type 1 and Type 7 for ARIES systems and the results compared. It should be
noted that ARIES reliability results are normally reported to only seven significant
digits: to obtain results suitable for comparison, it was necessary to modify _he
code to output 17.
The test cases, solutions, results, and difficulties encountered are discussed in the
fonowing sections.
4.2 Simplex Processor
A simplex processor was analyzed to point out any computational, as opposed to
modeling, differences. A constant failure rate of k was assumed. The probability of
failure (unreliability) for this system is given by:
P(SF) = 1-e -x_ .
For small kt,
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P(SF) = kt.
The results for each method are summarized in the following table:
M Direct Calculation _ CARE_
0 0 0 0
1.59 x 10 -23 -2.78 X 10 -17 0 1.59 x 10 -23
1.30 x 10 -19 -2.78 x 10 -17 0 1.30 x 10 -19
I x 10 -16 6.94 x 10 -17 6.94 x 10 -17 9.99 X 10 -17
5 x 10 -16 4.85 x 10 -16 4.85 x 10 -16 5.00 x 10 -16
1 x 10-15 9.99 x 10 -16 9.99 x 10 -1_ 1.00 x 10 -is
1 x 10 -12 9.99 X 10 -13 9.99 x 10 -13 9.99 x 10 -13
I x 10-1° 9.99 x 10-11 9.99 x 10-11 1.00 x 10-1°
I x 10 -3 9.995 x 10 -4 9.995 • 10 -4 9.995 • 10 -4
1 6.32 • 10 -1 6.32 • 10 -1 6.32 • 10 -1
* ARIES reports reliability. Unreliability was obtained by subtracting
reliability answers from 1.
Observe that for kt > 10 -15 an methods give the same answer. Also, note that
CARE m continues to provide accurate results for much smaller values of kt.
The ability of CARE HI to provide accurate answers stems from computing unrelia-
bility directly. Thus, computations involving very small differences between two
numbers which are close to unity are avoided. This, in turn, avoids approaching the
accuracy iimitations imposed by finite arithmetic. In fact, CARE HI uses single precision
arithmetic where the direct calculation method and ARIES use double precision arith-
metic.
While unimportant for this simple case, this distinction between CARE HI and
ARIES is important when analyzing more complex systems. Both accuracy and ¢xnnputa-
tion resource requirements are issues.
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4.3 TMIt
For the next case, a TMR system with no spares was chosen. The probability of
system failure(P(SF) ) for this systemis given by
P(SF) = 1 + 2e"3xt - 3e-2xt.
The estimates of unreliability from the hand calculation, from CARE HI, and from the
two ARIES types agreed closely and are summarized in the following table:
t Direct ARW_Sl ARn_S 7 CAREm
0 0 0 0 0
.01 2.99996139042E-12 2.99996E-12 2.99996E-12 2.9999939165E-12
.10 2.99995001063E-10 2.99995E-10 2.99995E-10 2.9999519535E-10
1 2.999500043E-8 2.999500043E-8 2.999500043E-8 2.9994993156E-8
5 7.4937529682E-7 7.4937529682E-7 7.4937529682E-7 7.4937446470E-7
10 2.99500474671E-6 2.99500474671E-6 2.99500474671E-6 2.9950040243E-6
7000 .50512196468 .50512196468 .50512196468 .50512194633
4.4 M out of N
The next system considered was an M out of N system; i.e., one in which failures in
M units out of N beginning units causes system failure. For this case, a seven out of
twelve system with perfect coverage was chosen. A failure rate of 10 -4 per hour and a
mission time of eight thousand hours were assumed. Using the standard combinatorial
solution,
121 pkq12-k,
P(SF) = k.7ki(l_--_k)l
p = 1 - e-xt and
q = e-kt,
P(SF) of .5288303411826796 at t=8000 was eXlX_ed.
where
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In the initial attempts to solve this system as a Type I, it was discovered that
ARIES was not correctly computing systems with more than one degradation and no
spares: the system would maintain perfect reliability for more than ten thousand hours
before a sudden decrease of several orders of magnitude. In addition, the Type I results
did not agree with the Type 7 results. Therefore, another modification was made to the
ARIES code to produce reasonable reliability computations for the Type I system. Also,
it was determined that an accuracy parameter had to be adjusted from its default value
for an accurate computation of the Type 7 system.
For this particular scenario, the ARIES Type 1 solution was .52883034118268013 at
t=8000; the Type 7 solution was .52883034118268137 at t=8000. Likewise, the CARE
HI solution was .52883034118 at t=8000. A graph of the unreliability estimates from
CA]_ HI, ARIF_, and the direct calculation is included in Figure 4.1. This graph illus-
trates the close agreement among the three solutions for the computed time range.
4,]5 Quintuplex
For this system, a failure rate of 10 -4 per hour, a mission time of 10 hours, per-
manent faults, and imperfect coverage were assumed. System failure was defined to be
the occurrence of four or more faults or the o(_xrrence of a sufficient number of faults
to preclude forming a majority from the remainlng active processors. In defining the
single fault model, it was assumed that (1) a fault is detected immediately as it produces
an error, (2) single point faults are excluded and (3) only two concurrent active faults
can cause system failure. Thus, for the CARE HI single-f,',_ult model shown in Figure
48
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3.3, PA, PB, c, C, 8 and p had to be selected'consistent with these assumptions. It was
also necessary that the Selected parameters would result in a double-fault model con-
sistent with these assumptions. Thus, the parameters were defined as follows:
PA= PB= 1,
(=0,
C: 1,
p:O, and
8 = 36(X)/hour.
The resulting double-fault model is shown in Figure 3.6.
This system can be represented by the Markov model shown in Figure 4.2, where A
is a single fault and AA is a double fault. In this model the path 5 good - A - AA - SF
the system to a triple fault during the recovery period, so that the probability of
)_3
loss of three out of five in time t is approximately 30_.t. Since the time spent in
recovery is small relative to the failure rate, the fault recovery states can be approxi-
mated by instantaneous coverage. With the instantaneous coverage approximations, the
model can be represented by the simplified model of Figure 4.3.
k3
Since probability of loss of three out of five in time t is approximately 30-_-t, triple
coincidences can be considered remote and can therefore be ignored. Thus, the dom-
inant path to SF due to lack of coverage is 5-4-SF. Using Laplace transforms,
so
4k
Figure 4.2. Markov Model for Teat Case 4
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Figure 4.3. Instantaneous Coverage Model for Test Case 4
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By Partial Fraction Expansion and taking the inverse transform,
The exhaustion of comlxments is approximately the failure of four out of five pro-
ccssorl. Thus,
For small kt,
P(SF)_ _ +S 1-c -xt -xt+ 1-e -xt 5 ,
so that at time t= 10, P(SF) = 5.$193_10 -12.
For the CARE HI analysis,thissystem was describedas a one-stagcsystem consist-
ing of fiveactivemodules and requiringa minimum of two fault-freemodules for con-
tinucd _tion. The system fault tree was described as consisting of one input and one
output, where the output, system failure, is contingent upon the failure of the stage. A
criticalpair fault tree was alsoincludedspcdfying criticalpairingbetween cvery two of
the five stage modules. Since CARE IW does not allow for the triple fault, the Pcov(SF)
computed by CARE HI is dominated by the Q(2) probability, i.e., the probability of
failure after two faults, and the P(SF) is thercforc overestimated. However, taking the
Q(3) component of the Pcov(SF) computed by CARE nl, which corresponds to the 5-4-
SF coverage path of the model, and adding this to the P" (Pexh(SF) assuming perfect cov-
erage ) component computed by CARE Eli, yields
P(SF) - 8.221588319x10 -12 + 4.9860181088x10 -12 = 5.8181769407x10 -12
at time t - 10.
£3
There is no transition in the _ model to correspond to the transition from 5
good to 3 good in this case. Thus, to construct an ARIES Type 1 description of this
case, the system was approximated by subsuming the 5 good to 3 good path into the 5
good to 4 good path. Using this approximation, the P(SF) was computed to be
5.81801x10 -12 at time t = 10.
The full Markov model was initially used to construct an ARIES Type 7 system and
the P(SI_) was computed to be 5.83694x10 -12 at time t=10. However, when this sam_
model was used with the states indexed so that the transition-rate matrix was upper tri-
angular rather than tridiagonal, the P(SF) was incorrectly computed. The results from
these two Type 7 descriptions are compared to the direct calculation in the following
table:
t Direct Calcul._cm ARIESType 7
0 0 0
1 8.83 • 10-15 1.83 • 10 -1_
5 5.2039 • 10 -13 5.1459 • 10 -13
10 5.81936 • 10 -12 5.83694 x 10 -12
Type 7 Re-_dexed
1.826535678 x 10 -8
1.825623497 • 10 -8
1.822027046 • 10 -8
1.818(X)7445 • 10 -8
Although the initial Type 7 estimate agrees fairly weU with_ the direct, c_c",lafion for
t=10 hours, the re-indexed model yields completely inaccurate estimates. This demon-
strates ARIES' sensitivity to the ordering of states.
Finally, the instantaneous coverage Markov model w_ us-._!to constr',,_ctan ARIES
Type 7 system. For this model, the P(SF) was computed to be 5.81907x10 -12 at time t =
10. The graph included in Figure 4.4 _ustrates the clese agreement among the esti-
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mates from tiffs Type 7 description, the Type 1, the CARE In, and .the direct calcula-
tion.
4.6 TMR with Powered Spares and Permanent Faults
The fifth system considered was a TMR with two powered spares and permanent
faults. For this system, a failure rate of 10 -4 per hour, a mission time of 10 hours, and
imperfect coverage were assumed. In defining the single fault model, the parameters
were selected as before so that
PA= PS= I,
G-O,
c= 1,
p--0, and
8 = 3600/hour.
This system can be represented by the Markov model shown in Figure 4.5. Using
instantaneous coverage, the model can be represented by the simplified model shown in
Figure 4.6. Since the dominant path to SF due to lack of coverage is (3,2) - SF,
P_(SF)= (1-c)(1 - e-3_).
P(SF) due to exhaustion of components is the probability of loss of four out of five, so
that
Thus,
Pexh(Sl_ = 5(1 - e-Xt)4e-xt + (1 - e-u) 5 .
6x2t e-xr)4e-x_ e-_3sP(S_ = -3- + 5(1- + (1 - .
Then for k = 10 -4, tt = 3600 per hour and t = 10 hours, P(SF) = 1.7165269x10 -10.
,0
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Figure 4.5. Markov Model for Test Case 5
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Figure 4.6. Instantaneous Coverage Model for Test Case 5
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For the CARE m analysis, this system was described as a one-stage system consist-
ing of five active modules and requiring a minimum of tWO fault-free modules for con-
tinued operation. The configuration of this system into t_rcc active and two powered
spare units was specified by means of the NOP parameter. The system fault tree was
described as consisting of one input and one output, where the ouq_t, system failure, is
contingent upon the failure of the stage. A critical pair fault tree was also included
specifying critical pairing between every two of the five stage modules. With this system
description and assuming an active unit failure rate of 10 -4 and a mission time of I0
hours, CARE i]I computed the P(SF) to be 1.7191249813x10 -m.
For the ARIES analysis, the system was described first as a Type 7 and then as a
Type I. The instantaneous coverage Markov model was used to construct the transition
matrix for the Type 7 analysis and the P(SF) was computed to be 1.716543x10 -1° at time
t = 10. For the Type 1 analysis the system was described as starting with three active
units and two spares and able to sustain one degradation (or r_ation). The
active and spare failure rates were specified to be 10 -4 per hour and the coverage
parameters for the possible system configurations were computed from the instantaneous
coverage Markov model. With this system description, the P(SF) was computed to be
1.7165291x10-I0 at time t = 10.
A graph of the results is included in Figure 4.7a. This graph illustratc_ the close
agreement among the estimates from CARE HI, ARIES, and the direct calculation.
Figure 4.7b shows the results obtained from an earlier version of CARE ffI. CARE ITI
estimates oscillate and are offset from the direct calculation.
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4.7 _ with Unpewered Spm'es
For the sixth system, a TMR with seven unpowered spares and permanent faults
was chosen. A failure rate of 10 -4 per hour, a mission time of 10 years = 87,600
hours, and imperfect coverage were assumed. 1"ne single fault model parameters are the
same as for Test Case 4.
Since the spares are unpewered, it was assumed that the failure rate for a spare is
zero until that spare is switched in to replace a failed active module. After the spare
becomes active, its failure rate is the same as that of an active module. This system is
represented by the Markov model shown in Figure 4.8. Approximating the fault
recovery states with instantaneous coverage as before, the model can be represented by
the simplified model in Figure 4.9.
Using Laplace transforms, the I_SF) due to lack of coverage is
so that
14,P_(SF)= s s _, (s__)2+ "'"+ (s+3x)s
= 3k(1-c)
s(s+3x) '
]P_(SF) = T 1-e-3xt "
Likewise, the P(SF) due to exhaustion of components is
s_-7_ts+3x) •
By partial fraction expansion for repeated roots and Lp-1 ,
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SF
Figure 4.8. Markov Model for Test Case 6
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s_ s_ s_ s_ s_
Figure 4.9. Instantaneous Coverage Markov Model for Test Case 6
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so(3xp -+ 26(3xp + 8(3x)" + 2(3x) .
The repeated roots in the solution for exhaustion of components are a result of the
tmpowered spare assumptions. In the expression for Peth(SF) derived by expanding
these roots, all terms up to the ninth power cancel. This cancellation muses computa-
tional problems in the first one thousand hours. In the Markov model for this case, the
unpowered spare assumptions result in a transition-rate matrix with non-distinct eigen-
values. Since the ARIES solution method is based on an assumption of distinct eigen-
values, this case also causes computational problems for ARIES.
In an ARIES Type 1 system, spares are assumed to be tmpowered if the spare
failure rate, IL, is less than the active module failure rate, k. Because of the distinct
k
eigenvalue restriction, tL must be greater than zero and _ :_ -_-_. For this test case,
k while the unmedi-
the modified version of ARIES can compute reliability with tt = 1"0
fled version can compute reliability with i_ : _ (but with computational errors for t
< 10000 hours).
Since ARIES will not allow tL to be zero, it overestimates the unreliability as com-
pared to the direct calculation. Also, making I_ as small as ARIES would accept for this
case (to minlmiTe the overestimation) resulted in computational errors for t < 10000.
The overestimation and the compu_rional errors are illustrated in the graph of the
results included in Figure 4.10.
A
In the Type 7 system, the transition-rate matrix is entered directly by the user and
any non-distinct eigenvalues arc dropped from the computation. Thus, in this case with
eigenvalues of -3_. (occurring 8 times) and -7._, the duplicates are dropped so that the
system is solved with only two eigenvalues, -3k and -2)_. As a result, the solution for
this system is the same as that for a TMR with-no spares, and the estimates of unrelia-
bllity cannot agree with those from the Type I and the direct calculation. The graph of
the Type 7 estimates is included in Figure 4.10 for comparison with the other graphs.
Since CARE 111 assumes that spares are powered, it was not possible to use CARE
!
I]I for this case.
4.8 AIPS-Like FCS
For the seventh system, a very simple AIPS-like FCS was chosen to highlight the
assumptions required to use ARIES and CARE HI to estimate the reliability of an
A/PS-like architecture. The system shown in Figure 4.11 was assumed to consist of
eight sets of quad sensors, eight sets of quad activators, and two triplex processors.
Failure rates of 10 -4 per hour per sensor, 10 -4 per hour per actuator, and 10 -3 per hour
per processor; perfect coverage for the sensors and actuators, imperfect coverage for. the
processors; permanent faults; and a mission time of 10 hours were assumed. The single
fault model parameters are the same as for Test Case 4. The system was assumed to
operate as follows:
After loss of the triplex processor set (three faults), its functions are performed by
the second triplex set, provided that it is still functional.
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The second triplex set was formerly performing non-critical functions and was not
vulnerable to critical fault pairs.
System failure occurs if and only if
• a sensor set is lost,
• an actuator set is lost, or
• the processing function is lost; i.e., two of the first triplex set are lost or two of the
second triplex set are lost.
In this system, the two triplex sets simulate FIMP and the reversion to the second
triplex set simulates functional migration. It was assumed that functional migration is
always successful. Point-to-point wiring, i.e., a 100% reliable network, was assumed.
Since triplex subsystems are considered triple, near-coincident faults are not a factor in
system failure. Also, sequence-dependent faults are not a factor in system failure
because of the reliability of the bus network.
The solution was obtained by decomposing the system into independent subsystems
so that
where
P(S 3= P(F. + P(EA)+ P0 p Ep,),
E s = Event of loss of a sensor set (1 of 8),
EA = Event of loss of an actuator set (1 of 8),
Ept = Event of loss of primary processor set (1 of 1),and
El,z = Event of loss of backup processor set (1 of 1)
Sincc'a sensor set is lost when three out of four sensors in the set arc lost, and there are
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eight sets,
P(Es) = 32X_t "_ •
Likewise,
P(_-,0= 32x_÷.
Since the processor sets are triplcx, loss of two results in loss of the set. It is immaterial
whether two faults are nearly coincident in this scenario. Thus, the single fault model is
unnecessary and
P_ptEp2) = P(EpI)P(EI_
- 9kilt 4 .
P(S_= 32x_t3+ 32x_t3+ 9xi_tA ,
Thus,
described as an 18-stage system
With this description, CARE HI
so that at 10 hours P(SF) = 1.54E-7.
For the CARE Ill analysis, the system was
represented by the system fault tree in Figure 4.12.
comlmted the P(SF) at 10 hours to be 1.5090886052E-07.
For the ARIES analysis, this system had to be defined as a series configuration of
homogeneous subsystcms. It was thcrcforc necessary to combine the two processor sub-
systems into onc subsystem to accommodate their particular configuration; the Markov
model in Figurc 4.13 describes the combined subsystem. Note that the Markov model
for the combined subsystem contains morc states than the two separate subsystem
models would. A transition rate matrix for a type 7 system was constructed from this
7O
J __
00
oO
Z
6SF
1,1
State Labelling:
I
M1,M 2 , where
I = state index
M 1 = # of good units on
first triplex
M 2 = # of good units of
second triplex
Figure 4.13. Markov Model for Processors of Test Case 7
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Markov model. The complete system was then solved by ARIES as a scrim configura-
tion of 16 type 1 (sensors and actuators) and one type 7 subsystems, resulting in a P(SF)
of 1.._g0c_06.54E-7 at 10 hours.
A graph of the results is included in Figure 4.14.
73
t_
L_
74
$.0 Assessments 8nd Condu_.om
S.l Objective tnd bslin! Psticuhn
The objcodvc of this scion is to assess the potential benefits and limitations of
CARE m and ARIES 82 when used for advanced fault tolerant systems applications.
Th_se benefits and limitations reported here were identified following a review of the
AIPS requirements, a study of the models upon which the tools were based, and apl_lica-
tion of these tools to the test cases described in Section 4.0, as well as to other simple
systems.
It is _ that the results of this investigation will provide guidance for planning
future reliability modeling research and development activities at NASA-I.aRC. To this
end, it is imlxaZant to recognize and understand both the potential benefits and limita-
tions of these tools. Understanding of these issues will help prevent misapplication of
the tools. Limitations with respect to application of these tools to advanced systems
could be eliminated by improvements or by the development of new tools.
The observations and comments regarding these tools fall into thr_ categories.
The most important category includes issues which have a clear and direct impact on the
capability to effectively represent advanced fault tolerant system configurations.
Another category includes issues which are likely to impact application of these tools to
advanced fault tolerant systems. Most items discussed will fall into these categories.
Finally, the utility of automated tools often is limited by the demands placed upon the
user. Consequently, a category for user-related issues is included.
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It should be noted that limitations have been identified for use of these tools to
model advanced architectures, in a wide range of aerospace applications. In order to not
seem unduly negative, these results must be viewed within the context of the applications
for which these tools were originally developed. Further, the significance of a particular
limitation must be judged by the importance and scope of the advanced archi_
fcatutc that creates the limitation.
5.2 CARE m ,t.atmmment
CARE 111 is the most recent in a series of reliability assessment tools developed by
• NASA LaRC. It was designed primarily for analyzing ultrarellable flight control sys-
tems. It is described as a general purpose reliability analysis and design tool for fault
tolerant systems and it is capable of handling large highly reliable systems. A fault han-
dfing model is used to model detection, isolation, and recovery processes. CARE HI
provides a variety of stationary and nonstationary fault and error models. These include
permanent, transient, intermittent, design, latent, and software faults or errors. CARE
Ill features a user-oriented fault tree language for describing complex system confignra-
tions and success criteria.Ill] [12]
A number of CARE rips characteristics would be useful for analysis of advanced
systems. The most important is the capability to analyze large systen:.s. In the fault
occurrence model, CARE HI can handle up to 70 stages as well as 2000 total events and
70 input events. Input events are the lowest level input to gates in the fault tree a_ad
other events are inputs or outputs at higher levels in the fault tree. A stage may
comprise one or more modules. Each stage with replicated modules is treated as an M
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out of N subsystem. When coupled with the options for multiple fault handling models,
very large and complex systems can be modeled. CARE HI accomplishes a large stat_
reduction by decomposition and aggregation techniques. The fault occurrence and fault
handling par_ of the model are decomposed under the assumption thai there arc several
orders of magnitude difference between the fault occurrence and the fault recovery
rates. This is referred to as a temporal decomposition. Further decomposition and
aggregation occurs when states across stages arc aggregated based on the fault tree and
the critical pair tree. This is somewhat similar to some of the structural decomposition
and aggregation techniques used in other reliability tools.[3] [13]
The flexible fault handling/coverage/double fault features of CARE IH distinguish it
from other reliability analysis tools. For applications where mission duration is short
relative to the time between failure occurrences, system failure due to failures in fault
handling or critically coupled double faults during recovery may be significant relative to
failureby exhaustion of components. In such applications, the capability to model the
fault handling and recovery processes should be important.
CARE ]I['s capability to model nonconstant failure rates (WcibuU distribution) also
distinguishes it from some other reliability modeling tools. This feature is useful for sys-
tems that contain components subject to wear out, such as mechanical actuators and
some electronic components, and possibly for electronic systems subject to radiation
exposure. For applications where nonconstant failure rates and failures duc to com-
ponent exhaustion arc significant, CARE Hrs features could prove useful.
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CARE 111 has undergone extensive testing and verification. The numerical accuracy
for extremely reliable and ultra-reliable reliable systems should be adequate.
In summary, the CARE 111 features that have potential value for reliability analysis
of advanced fault tolerant aerospace systems are the capability to handle large systems,
the somewhat flexible fault handling model, the capability to have nonconstant fault
occurrence rates and the capability to model near coincident failures by the critically cou-
pled pair or double fault model.
A number of CARE firs limitations with respect to AIPS applications stem from
space missions of long duration. As noted earlier, Care HI was specifically designed to
evaluate reliability for air transport flight control systems. Mission durations are consid-
erably shorter in these applications. Emphasis will shift from fault handling failures to
exhaustion of components failures. The product of mission duration and failure rate
changes by several orders of magnitude. As a result, approximations used in the CARE
111 computations could no longer be valid. Also, the longer mission intervals and the
need to conserve power or weight in space applicati Iolns can dictate the need to use
unpowered spare modules. Presumably, these modules, while unpowered, would have
lower failure rates than their powered counterparts.
In Section 4.6 it was indicated that CARE HI requires that spare modules have the
same failure rate as active modules.
open systems, i.e., maintenance will
(maintenance free) systems.
Finally, some space applications will operate as
be permitted. CARE HI only models dosed
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The need to model sequence dependent failures sometimes arises when fault
tolerant systems are considered. One of the more important cases for AIPS stems from
the function migration concept. The concept can allow a function to be carried out by an
alternate processing site (system resource) when the processing site initially used for the
function fails. The capability to migrate the function could depend upon a fault-free
int_puter network or a mass memory resource. If the failure of the initial process-
ing site occurs prior to the loss of the mass memory, the function can be migrated suc-
cessfully. If the mass memory failure precedes the loss of the initial processing site, the
function will be lost. In the function migration cases, reliability analysis may focus on
exhaustion of resources rather than coverage failures. CARE nl can be used to bound
the effects of sequence-dependent failures. However, the sequence dependence failure
modes introduced by function migration could require better capability in this area.
In Section 2.0 the need to analyze the reliability of large nodal communication net-
works was identified. CARE HI cannot model these networks. It should be noted that
tools to analyze reliability for these networks have not been developed.
Several potential limitations of the CARE HI fault h.ndll.g model have been identi-
fied. These are
1. The fundamental assumption that sojourn times in the fault han-
dling model are small relative to the time between fault occurrences
may not be valid for latent faults or for some intermittent faults.
2. The fault handling models used are independent of system state.
For some systems it may be realistic to expect coverage to
deteriorate as system resources are reduced. CARE HI can be used
to bound the reliability of such systems.
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3. The fault handling model is comtrained to a single entry state, to
have identical transition rates (a, _) between active and benign for
faulted and error-producing states, and transitions between some
states of the model are omitted. These are flexibility issues of more
interest for research purposes.
4. The double fault model is conservative. A system failure results if
two critically coupled faults occur even though neither has produced
an error. This assumption could result in a too conservative predic-
tion when faults of long latency periods are present, e.g., software-
dependent hardware faults.
Multiple near coincident faults, multiple faults that occur within the fault handling inter-
val following the occurrence of the first fault, of order higher than two cannot be
modeled by CARE HI. This case was demonstrated by the qulntuplex example of Sec-
tion 4.0. As indicated, the reliability for this simple system could be obtained indirectly
from CARE HI analysis of a TMR with two spares. The quin._aplex configuration, an
important fault tolerant configuration, is not presently used in Ali'S, but that is not to
say that critical triples will not arise in any AIPS applications nor should one expect the
quintuplex to be absent from other advanced fault tolerant systems. Further, it should
not be inferred that the indirect method using CARE HI will work satisfactorily for
more complex configurations or where other critical triples arise.
CARE Eli calculates reliability based on the assumption that the probability that
there are no failed modules in the system equals 1 _t t=0. Perfect dispatch reliability
can be approached but not obtained for complex systems. For extremely reliable sys-
tems, very high dispatch reliability is required. Consequently, the capability to set the
initial state occupancy probabilities to values other than "perfect dispatch" is highly
desirable.
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During this investigation, several individuals of differing backgrounds have learned
to use CARE IlL The earliest user learned at a time when CARE HI was being wll-
dated and modified and at a time prior to the publication of the user's gui_es. During
this period, results were sometimes suspect due to the status of CARE rrl modifications.
Pre_'ntly, users are confident of CARE nl results. The new user's guides have speeded
the learning process and represent a quantum improvement in the documentation.
S.3 ARIES 82 Assessment
ARIES 82 is an interactive, unified reliability modeling tool developed by Ng and
Avizienis at UCLA. It models systems which are composed of a series of independent
homogeneous subsystem_ each of which can be modeled as a finite-state, continuous
parameter, time-homogentxras Markov process. IJmited state aggregation is achieved by
t
analyzing the independent subsystems and combining the results. Fault handling is
assumed to be instantaneous and it's effects are captured by constant coverage probabili-
ties which depend upon system state. As ind/cated in Section 3.0, ARIES 82 can be
applied to a wide range of system scenarios.
The features of ARIES 82 which are of potential benefit to advanced fault telerant
system studies are
1. The capability to model closed or open systems.
2. Spare modules can have failure rates that are different than active
module failure rates.
3. A state transition matrix can be used to des_be a sy_tera.
4. An interactive user interface.
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Someof the _xitatious of ARIES 82 are
1. Instantaneous coverage may not be adequate for modeling some sys-
tems. When fault handling times are mall relative to the time
between fault occurrences, this simple model is often adequate.
2. Constant failure rates arc not adequate for modeling certain com-
ponents of aerospace systems.
3. System sizes are limited to relatively small systems.
4. The accuracy of the results are suspect for highly reliable systems.
Accuracy limitations are noted several times in Section 4.0.
5. The eigenvalues of the state transition matrix must be distinct. Re-
peated eigenvalues can occur, for example, when spare failure rates
are zero until they are activated.
The accuracy limitations arc restrictive. ARIES 82, in contrast to CARE HI, com-
putes reliability instead of unreliability. For very reliable systems, this approach stresses
the numerical accuracy of the host computer and is the source of some of the accuracy
problems. Also, _ 82 normally reports only 7-digit results. The semitivity of the
results to the order in which system states are indexed was noted in Section 4.0. Also,
nearly distinct eigenvalues can lead to accuracy problems.
I
ARIES 82 has been in use as a tool to support university teaching and research.
But ARIES 82 has not undergone a rigorous validation process. Even for the relatively
few and simple cases run for this study, at least two programming errors that produced
erronec_ results were found.
Learning to use ARIES 82 was judged to be somewhat simpler than CARE HI.
This was due, in part, to the relative simplicity of the ARIES 82 model.
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5.4 Conclusions
A number of useful features were recognized in ARIES 82. Accuracy limitations,
lack of formal validation, the presence of programming errors, the lack of product sup-
port, and the limitations on system size combine to make ARIES 82 unsuitable for
modeling advanced fault-tolerant systems.
CARE HI was found to have features desirable for modeling advanced system
architectures. Among these were the capability of handling large systems, a somewhat
flexible fault handling model, noncomtant failure rates in the fault occurrence model,
q
the provision for near coincident double faults, the computational accuracy required for
analyzing ultrareliable systems, and a user interface which provides for simple and flexi-
ble system definition.
A number of CARE m limitations were identified. Among the more important
system scenarios which were difficult to model or could not be modeled using CARE HI
were
I. Systems with unpowered spares,
2. " Systems where equipment mainremance must be considered,
3. Systems where failure depends on the sequence in which faults oc-
curred,
4. Systems where multiple faults greater than a double near coincident
fault must be considered,
5. Systems con_g large nodal communications networks that have
a significant impact on system reliability, and
6. Systems where less than perfect dispatch reliability must be con-
sidered.
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Subject to constraints cited in paragraph 5.2 and repeated below, CARE HI is best
suited for evaluating the reliability of advanced fault tolerant systems for air transport.
Characteristics of systems for which CARE rn is best suited are
1. The mission time is short relative to the time between failure oc-
currences. That is, coverage failures dominate exhaustion of com-
ponent failures.
2. The fault recovery time is short relative to the time between failure
OC_lrrell_.
3. Either the network reliability cannot impact system reliability or the
network can be treated as an independent subsystem whose reliabili-
ty can be determined by other means.
4. Near coincident multiple faults of order greater than two are not
relevant.
5. System reliability should be in the extremely to ultrareliable regime.
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FINAL REPORT
NASA CONTRACT # NAS1-16489
TASK 16
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF CARE HI
AND ARIES 82 FOR RELIABILITY
ANALYSIS OF AIPS ARCHITECTURE
March 15, 1985
Robert Baker
Charlotte Scheper
Research Triangle Institute
Research Triangle Park, NC 27709
SCOPE OF WORK
• Learn AIPS and Determine Suitability of
CARE III and ARIES for AIPS Analysis
• Compare CARE III and ARIES
• Apply CARE IT[ and ARIES to "AIPS Like"
Architectures
• Identify Limitations and Recommend
Refinements
• Document
89
AIPS OBJECTIVES
Design a fault and damage tolerant system
architecture which satisfies real-time data pro-
cessing requirements for aerospace applications
Develop support methods for design, evalua-
tion, and verification
90
AIPS APPLICATION REQUIREMENTS
COMMERCIAL
AIRCRAFt
TACTICAL
M]IXI'ARY
AIRCRAFT
SPACE
PLATFORM
SPACE
VEHICLE
DEEP SPACE
I_OBE
MANNED SPACE
PLATFORM
SPACE
VEHICLE.
I0 h_
4hn
5y_
I wk
5yn
20yrs
I0 days
40K
10-9
10-7
10-2
10-2
10-2
10-7
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Thruput
5.5 MIPS
6MIPS
2MIPS
.5 MIPS
.5 MIPS
15 MIPS
1.5 MIPS
3O
Memory
2MB
1MB
75O KB
300 KB
30O KB
20MB
3MB
6O
Mass
15MB
100 MB
75O KB
30O KB
1MB
400MB
3MB
1000
IJO Rates
750 Kb/s
1Mb/s
150 Kb/s
1.5Mb/s
15 M/bs
1 Mb/s
100
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AIPS SYSTEM A_UTF__
(QUALITATIVE REQUIREMENTS)
• Growth .and change Tolerance
• Accepts Technology Upgrades
• Graceful Degradation
• System Complexity Transparent to User
• Graded Redundancy
• Damage Tolerance
BUILDING BLOCKS
FTMP
FTP
Intercomputer Network (Fault and Damage Tolerant)
I/O Network (Fault and Damage Tolerant)
Fault Tolerant Mass Memory
Fault Tolerant Power Distribution System
Network Operating System
. 93
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10
0
0
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SOME KEY FAULT TOLERANT FEATURES
OF AIPS ARCHITECTURE
• FrMP and FTP Concepts
• Hardware Redundancy
• Redundant Elements in Tight Synchronism
• Fault Detection and Making Implemented
in Hardware
• Fault Isolation and Reconfiguration
in Software
• Layered Communications Network
• Source Congruency
• FunctionMigration
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SOME AIPS ARCHITECTURAL FEATURES, CONCEPTS,
AND APPLICATION REQUIREMENTS IMPACTING
RELIABILITY ASSESSMENT
• Function Migration
• Partial Cross-Strapping
• Large Networks
• High Degree of Fault Tolerance
• Both Long and Short Mission Times
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_AL PAG'_ 1_
OF POOR QUALITY Simple Network
12 Links
0 Nodes
3 Failures for L.O.S.
2 Failures Loss Nodes
SI $2 $3
PI
,kl
P2
A2
P3
IL3
Sensors
Processors
Actuators
Alternate Network
15 Links
I0 Nodes
X
3
Y
3 Failures to Isolate Nodes
t3 F'ailur_._ f,)r Ix)ss of S)'st,.m
Network R,'liabilitv I)_es Not
Iml)aCt ._wlem l¢,.liability
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A, Draper Proposed
AIPS Network
O
Problem: To Identify
Combinations of
Link Losses Which
Will Cause Loss
of System
• Difficult by Hand
(This net may have tO0)
s Must be Mechanized
GNC NETWORK
_) FLIGHT DECK
7_ STABLE MEMBER
4_ * FWD AVIONICS
APU
• JG1. G2, G3 - ROOT NODES FOR ONE PROCESSING SITE
iG4, G5, G6 - R()OT NODES FOR OTHER PROCESSING SITE
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CARE HI FEATURF_ AND ATTRIBUTF_
• Designed for Ultrareliable Flight
Control System Analysis and Design
• Handles Large Systems
• Large Reduction of State Space Via Aggregation
• Fault Handling Model {Permanent, Intermittent, Transient}
• Exponential and Wiebull Failure Rates
• Double Fault Model
• Analyze Closed Systems
• Fault Tree Input
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ARIF_,S82 FEATURES
Designed and Used for University Reliability Projects
Markov Model
f'mite-state
continuous-parameter
time-homogeneous
State Aggregation: Limited Structural Decomposition
Instantaneous, State-Dependent Coverage '
Constant Transition Rates
Transient and Permanent Faults
Spares
powered
Parametric Description for Six Basic Systems
Matrix Description for General Systems
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ARIES SYSTEMS
Type 1 Closed FT System
Type 2
Type 3
Type 4
Closed FT System with Transient Fault Recovery
Mission-Oriented Repairable System
Repairable System with Transient Fault Recovery
Type 5 Repairable System with Restart
Type 6 Periodically Renewed Closed FT System
Type 7 State Transition Rate Matrix
Types 1-6 are fixed models
specified parametric values.
instantiated by user-
Type 7 accepts a user-defined transition-rate matrix
describing the complete system.
leS
TYPE 1
Closed FT System with permanent faults.
No external repair or renewal.
System has spares and can degrade after spares are
exhausted.
Ability to degrade can be blocked by unrecoverable
spare failures.
Standby spares periodically tested.
Spare selection is predetermined.
A failed module is removed from system.
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TYPE 1 PARAMETERS
D
$
C$
Number of DqX'adations
Number of Spares
Spare Coverage
Active module failure rate
pL Spare module failure rate
v Active resource vector
cy Coverage vector
Y - (A,A-I,...,A-D, A-(D+ I))
CY ffi(CA,CA-!,. '. • , CA-D, CA-(D+I))
IN
TYPE1 PARAMETERS--RESTRICTIONS & ASSUMPTIONS
CS<I => (A,S,D) states can be entered
models blocked spares
k and are constant
t* - k => powered spares
0<}_<k
_/___ 10e
=> unpowered spares
(as specified)
CY[0] is coverage for all transitions from
states possessing spares
CY[D+ 1]=0 when no safe shutdown state
is provided .
109
TYPE 7 GENERAL MISSION-ORIENTED FT SYSTEMS
Any system that can be represented
transition-rate matrix Q of the form
Q ffi [tqj,i-jl
by a single state
where qij is the transition rate from state i to state j, and
qi is the rate from state j to state j
Matrix can be input to ARIES symbolically
numerical values
or with actual
110
TYPE 7 (cont.)
System states can be partitioned into 5 disjoint subsets
Full Capacity (FC)
Degraded Capacity (DG)
FC with Blocked Spares (FCB)
Safe _utdown (SS)
Crash Failure (CF)
so that Q -- FC
DG
FCB
SS
CF
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SOLUTION
Assumptions
System is finite-state, continuous-parameter Markov process.
Markov process is time-homogeneous.
Transition-rate matrix has distinct eigenvalues.
Solution
Transition-Rate Matrix
P(t)- (Pl(t),P2(t),...,pn(t))
P(t) - QP(t)
P'(t) = eOtp(o)
State Probabilities (n operational states)
System Equation
Solution
n
Rk(t ) = _ Pi(t)
1=1
ARIES Solution using
Sylvesters 4,.... ,,,/U/I£JL Ull3
Reliability of k th subsystem
R(t) = _ Rk(t)
k=l
System Reliability (m subsystems)
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MOTIVATION AND CRITERIA FOR
TEST CASES
Should demonstrate how to use the tool
Should demonstrate general applicability and
limitations (not an exhaustive test of features)
Should be solvable using standard techniques
IU
TEST CASES DO NOT DEMONSTRATE
FULL CAPABILITY OF CARE HI OR ARIES
In Particular for CARE Ill, the Following Important
Features were not Highlighted
The Impact of Aggregation of States in Handling Very
Large Systems
• Full Use of Fault Handling Model Features
• Non-constant Failure Rates
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TF_T CASES
Simplex Processor
TMR with No Spares
M out of N
M out of N with Triple Fault
TMR with Powered Spares
TMR with Unpowered Spares
AIPS-like FCS
115
TEST CASE 1
Description
A simplex processor with a constant failure
rate k.
Purpose
A simple case to point out any computational,
as opposed to modelling, differences.
Solution
P(SF) = I - ext
= Xt for small kt
116
Results
kt Direct Calculation ARIES* CARE HI
0 o1.59 x 10 -23 .78 x 10 -17
1.30 x 10 -19
1 x 10 -16
5 x 10 -16
1 x 10 -15
1 x 10 -12
1 x 10 -10
1 x 10 -3
1
-2.78 x 10 -17
6.94 x 10 -17
4.85 x 10 -16
9.99 x 10 -15
9.99 x 10 -13
9.99 x 10 -11
9.995 x 10 -4
6.32 x 10 -1
0
0
0
6.94 x 10 -17
4.85 x 10 -16
9.99 x 10 -16
9.99 x 10 -13
9.99 x 10 -11
9.995 x 10 -4
6.32 x 10 -1
0
1.59 x 10-23
1.30 x 10 -19
9.99 X 10-17
5.00 x 10 -16
1.00 x 10-15
9.99 x 10 -13
1.00 x 10-1°
9.995 x 10 -4
6.32 x 10 -1
For k > 10-15, all methods give the same answer.
CARE III answers are accurate for much smaller values of
kt.
Increased accuracy of CARE III results from computing
unreliability directly.
*ARIES reports reliability. Unreliability was obtained by subtracting
ARIES reliability answers from 1.
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TEST CASE 2
Description
A TMR system with no spares.
Constant failure rate k.
Purpose
Another basic system.
Solution
P(SF) = 1 + 2e -3xt- 3e, 2xt
Results
t
0
1
5
10
.01
.10
7O00
Direct
0
2.999500043E-8
7.4937529682E-7
2.99500474671E-6
2.99996139042E-12
2.99995001063E-10
.50512196468
AItlES 1
0
2.999500043E-8
7.4937529682E-7
2.99500474671E-6
2.99996E-12
2.99995E-10
.50512196468
AltlES 7
0
2.999500043E-8
7.4937529682E-7
2.99500474671E-6
2.99996E-12
2.99995E-10
.50512196468
calm
0
2.9994993156E-8
7.4937446470E-7
2.9950040243E-6
2.9999939165E-12
2.9999519535E-10
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TF_T CASE 3
Description: M out of N
12 Processors
Perfect Coverage
SF iff 7 or More Faults
7 or More Faults
k = 10-%our/processor
t = 8000 hours
Purpose
A Basic M Out of N System
Solution
1__! pkq12-kP(SF) = _ k!( k)l
k=7
p = 1 - e -xtwhere
-kt
q=e
Results
Direct C_dc_dation
tffi8000 .5288303411826796
ARIES Type1
.52883034118268013
ARJES Type'/
.52883034118268L37 .528831D4118
The initial results for ARIES Typel were incorrect: perfect reliability was
maintained for more than 10,000 hours and then dropped several orders of
magnitude. It was determined that ARIES was not correctly computing sys-
tems with >1 degradation and no spares. A modification wasmade to pro-
duce correct results.
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TEST CASE 4
Description: M out of N
5 processors
k = 10-4/hour/processor
Permanent Faults
SF iff
• 4 or more faults
• Faults preclude majority of good processors
Single Fault Model
• A fault is detected immediately as it produces
an error
• Single point faults are excluded
• Only 2 concurrent active faults can cause SF
Imperfect Coverage
PA-- PB---- 1
E=0
c--I
prO
8 = 3600/hour
Purpose
An M out of N System with Triple Fault
121
TEST CASE 4 (cont'd)
Model
8
Solution
Since ),/6 is small, instantaneous coverage can be used to
simplify the model.
Exhaustion of Components
4kc2 3kc 3
Test Case 4
(continued)
Dominant Term Due to Lack of Coverage
,{ )l, l
- S S+4k S+4k ci(I-c2)
By Partial Fraction Expansion and -1
The Exhaustion of Componcnts Is Approximately the Failure of 4
Out of 5.
Thus,
Ps_t) --" -_ [1--Se-4kt + 4e-5kt] + 5(1--e-kt)4-kt+ (1-e-Xt) 5
For Smallkt
PSF(t) _-- 30k3t2_ + 5(l--e-Xt}4c-kt + (l--e-Xt) 5
123
Test Case. 4
(continued)
Results
_, Direct ARm__I ARIF,S.2 CAREm
10 5.81936 x 10-12 5.81801 x 10-12 5.81907 • 10-12 5.81935 • 10-12
This case is not directly computable by CARE HI due to the triple fault. Our result was
obtained by using CARE m to solve for the P(SF) due to loss of 4 out of 5 processors
and adding the hand-calculated P(SF) due to lack of coverage.
The ARIES Type I solutionisan approximationmade by includingthe path from 5 good
to3 good in the pathfrom 5 good to 4 good.
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TEST CASE 5
Description
TMR with 2 Powered Spares and Permanent Faults
k = 10,4/hour/processor
t -- 10 hours
Imperfect Coverage
p=0
c=l
e=0
PA=PB = 1
8 = 3600/hour
Purpose
Easily Analyzed Using Instantaneous Coverage
Well Suited for CARE HI and ARIES
Results
t=lO 1.7165269 x 10 -1° 1.7165291 • 10-1°
ARI_7
1.716543 x 10-1°
CAREm
1.7068601501 x 10 -1°
TF.,ST CASE 5 (cont'd)
Model
k 0
CASE $
Solution
Since k/_ is very small, the above model can be simplified by using
instantaneous coverage.
Coverage Components
(4 of 5)
PsF[t] ffi -'_ + 5 +
121
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TEST CASE 6
Description
TMR with 7 Unpowered Spares and Permanent Faults
k = 10-4/hour
t = 10years = 87,600 hours
Imperfect Coverage
Of 0
e=l
t=0
PA=PB = 1
It = 3600/hour
Purpose
Markov Model Has Multiple. Eigenvalues
130
TEST CASE 6
Model
_8 8
SF
s_ s_ s_ s_ so
Inmmtaneom Coverage Markov Model
I.M
Solution
Lack of Coverage
S S k (S+3k) 2 (S+3k) 8
[P_(t)] -- 3x(1-e)
s(s+3_,)
Poor(t)
__
Exhaustion of Components
13 ol,S+2k S+3k
By Partial Fraction Expansion for Repeated Roots and -1.
PcE(t)
-- 1-3Se-2Xt + e-3Xt [6560 + 2186(3k)t + 728(3k)2-_ -_--- + 242(3k) 3
k 4t424 k 5t51207206 t7 ]+ 80(3 ) + 26(3 ) + 8(3k)6_t_--_-_ + 2(3k) 7
- 5040
All Terms Up to the 9th Power Cancel
Source of Computational Problems in First 1000 Hours.
132
Results
Type 1
Will Not Accept _t - 0
k
Should Accept _t ffi
Unmodified Version Accepts _ ffi
k
Modified Version Accepts _ ffi ----10
k
m
100
Type 7
Eigenvalues Are -3_. (8 times and -2k)
To Solve System, Duplicates Are Dropped So System Is
Solved with 2 eigenvalues, -3k and -2k
Solution for This System Is Same As For TMR With No Spares
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TEST CASE 7
To Highlight Assumptions Required to Use ARIES
and CARE III for an AIPS-like Architecture
• The Two Triplex Sets Simulate FTMP
• The Reversion to the Second Triplex Set
•Simulates Functional Migration (Assume Perfect)
• Assumed NetwOrk Does Not Impact Reliability
• Triple, Near-Coincident Faults Are Not a Factor
in Loss of System. For This, Quinmplex Processors
Are Needed. Thus, CARE 11I Does Not Need to
Accommodate More than 2 Near-Coincident Faults.
• Sequence-Dependent Faults Are Not a Factor in
Loss of System Because of the Reliabiliy of the
Bus Network
13"/
Description
Test Case 7
(continued)
A1PS-Like FCS
Quad sensors,
Quad Actuators, kA --
Triplex Processors,
Triplex Processors,
Permanent Faults
Perfect Coverage
t ffi 10 hours
ks = lO-4/hour/sensor (8 sets)
lO-4/hour/actuator (8 sets)
km = lO-3/hour/processor (1 set)
kp2 - lO-3/hour/processor (1 set)
• System Operation
After loss of the triplex processor set, its functions are performed
by the second triplex set, provided that it is still functional
Second triplex set was formerly performing non-critical functions
and was not vulnerable to critical fault pairs.
• LOC iff
Loss of a Sensor Set (1 of 8)
Loss of an Actuator Set (1 of 8)
Loss of Processing Function
Loss of 2 of the First Triplex Set
Loss of 2 of the Second Triplex Set
138
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Solution
Test Case 7
(continued)
Independent Subsystems Leads to
Structural Decomposition
P[SF] = P(Es) + P(EA) + P(Ep1Ep2)
Es = Loss of Sensor Set (1 of 8)
EA ffi Loss of Actuator Set (1 of 8)
EpI -- Loss of Primary Processor
Ep2 -
P[Es] -_ 32ks3 t3
P[EA] = 32k3A t3
Loss of Backup Processor
P[EluEl_ - P[Epl]P[Ep2]
.-- 9k_t 4
P[SF] -_ 32ks 3 t 3 + 32k3A t 3 + 9k_ t 4
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TEST CASE 7
Model (Processor sets)
5
142
TEST CASE 7
(continued)
Results
t=lO
Direct
1.54 X 10 -7
ARIES CARE HI
1.5090900654X 10-7 1.5090886052X 10-7
Each Subsystem Fits ARIES Type 1 Model
Series Configuration of Subsystems Assumed
Processor Subsystems are not Configured Serially- Can Be
Combined Into One Type 7 Subsystem
CARE III Fault Tree Allows More Flexibility in Configuring
System
14kl
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C3
USER-RELATED
Advantages
Interactive.
Can save and reload a system.
Help facility.
Output in plottable format.
Can create log file.
Can accept input from a command file.
Can Compute Other PerformanceMeasures:
Mean time to first failure.
System failure rate.
Normalized probability of failure.
Reliability improvement factor
(one system vs. another).
Mission time improvement factor
(one system vs. another).
Life-Cycle measures
(for single subsystem).
Disadvantages
Cannot modify a system and reload it.
Cannot exit from define command prompts.
Necessary information scattered throughout
user's guide.
No support.
CARE IT[ USER-RELATED
Advantages
System Fault Tree Input
Easily Modified Input Files
Output Provides Feedback
Output Options
Limited Plotting Capability
Disadvantages
Not Fully Interactive
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OBSERVATIONS REGARDING CARE HI
• Does Not Handle Near Coincident Faults for N>2
• Does Not Handle Sequence Dependent Faults
• Double Fault Model Is Conservative
• Designed for Ultrareliable Regime
• Spares Must be Powered
• Fault Handling Model While Somewhat Flexible
is Restrictive in Some Respects, e.g., Only
One Entry Point Identical Transition Rates
on Intermittent States, Does Not Depend on
System State, Fault Handling Time Assumed Short
Relative to Failure Rate
• Closed System
• Not Fully Interactive
14"/
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CARE HI LIMITATIONS FOR AIPS APPLICATIONS
• Evaluates Closed System
(Some AIPS Applications Include Maintenance)
• Sequence Dependent Faults Not Directly Evaluated
(Function Migration, Partial Cross-Strapping)
• Unpowered Spares Not Handled
(Unpowered Spares A Must for Space)
• AIPS Needs Tool to Evaluate Network Reliability
CARE HI FEATURES OF POTENTIAL VALUE TO AIPS
• Fault Handling Model
• Handles Large Systems
• Evaluation of Reliability in Ultrareliable
Regime
• Non Constant Failure Rates
• Double Fault Model
IO
ARIES CONCLUSIONS
MODEL
Advantages
Flexible with respect to spares
powered, unpowered, blocked.
Parametric instantiation of six
predefined system models
Accepts matrix description of systems
Disadvantages
Instantaneous coverage (computed externally
by user)
Constant transition rates
Spares can be unpowered but must have a
nonzero failure rate no smaller than
X/lOs and sufficiently large
to insure distinct eigenvalues
ACCURACY
Only reports reliability to seven digits
Unverified and unsupported
Bugs
Inaccurate results for typel systems with
more than 1 degradation and no spares
Inaccurate copy of subsystems
Various errors in interactive prompts
Calculation of reliability as opposed to unreliability
subjects it to computational stress
An accuracy parameter has to be adjusted to get
accurate results for type 7 systems
Jp
Inaccurate results can occur when eigenvalues are
not distinct
151
CONCLUSION
• Subject to Limitations Previously Stated
CARE III Can Be Used to Assess Reliability
of AIPS-like Architectures.
• While ARIES Has A Number of Desirable Features,
Its Limited Accuracy and its Status with Respect
to Validation are Sufficient to Rule Out Its
Use For AIPS.
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